University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Political Science Scholarship

Political Science

Fall 2003

Accountability And Ethics: Reconsidering the Relationships
Melvin J. Dubnick
University of New Hampshire - Main Campus, Mel.dubnick@UNH.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/polisci_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
Commons

Recommended Citation
Dubnick, M. Accountability And Ethics: Reconsidering the Relationships, International Journal of
Organization Theory and Behavior, 6, no. 3 (Fall, 2003): 405-441.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at University of New Hampshire
Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact
Scholarly.Communication@unh.edu.

INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
BEHAVIOR, 6(3), 405-441

OF

ORGANIZATION

THEORY
AND
FALL 2003
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RELATIONSHIPS
Melvin J. Dubnick*

ABSTRACT. While a relationship between accountability and ethics has long
been assumed and debated in Public Administration, the nature of that
relationship has not been examined or clearly articulated. This article makes
such an effort by positing four major forms of accountability (answerability,
blameworthiness, liability and attributability) and focusing on the ethical
strategies developed in response to each of these forms.
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between “accountability” and “ethics” has long
been a concern among students of public administration. Accountability
has traditionally been regarded as the means used to control and direct
administrative behavior by requiring “answerability” to some external
authority. It has deep roots in American constitutional history, and can be
linked to the principles implicit in the Magna Carta as well as our system
of checks and balances. In public administration, ethics has most often
been associated with standards of responsible behavior and professional
integrity in light of the growth of the administrative state and the
expansion of discretionary powers to public sector bureaucracies.
Issues about the relationship between the accountability and ethics
were central to the Friedrich-Finer debate of the early 1940s – one of
core debates that set the intellectual agenda for American public
administration during the Cold War era. In a 1940 essay, Friedrich
(1940) argued that the traditional means (e.g., oversight and control) for
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holding administrators accountable were ineffective and unnecessary. It
was reasonable, he contended, to defer to the judgment of administrators
whose sense of professional responsibility and loyalty could be trusted
when they carried out public policy in the national interest. In response,
Finer (1941) reasserted the widely held view that, despite the greater
sense of professional responsibility among today’s administrators,
democracy still requires enhanced public control and direction of
administrative agents.
That exchange was – and remains – the classic expression of the
conventional relationship between ethics and accountability in public
administration (Burke, 1986; Harmon, 1995; Gruber, 1987; McSwite,
1997). Fundamental to that view is the assumption that the commitment
of modern administrators to conduct themselves responsibly (i.e.,
ethically, in accord with “democratic morality”) was not sufficient to
insure that the will of the people would be carried out. Accountability, in
the form of external (i.e., democratic ) constraints and controls, was
necessary as well. Accountability mechanisms were required to render
the decisions and behavior of public officials responsible, not merely in
the legal, political or bureaucratic senses of that term, but morally as well
(Appleby, 1952; Gilbert, 1959; Marx, 1949). Ethical behavior, in short,
required the presence of external accountability mechanisms in all their
various forms.
Does accountability foster ethical or morally responsible behavior?
Despite considerable scholarship devoted to the examination of efforts to
control the bureaucracy through various accountability mechanisms
(Aberbach, 1990; Balla, 1998; Calvert, McCubbins & Weingast 1989;
Harris, 1964; Hood, James & Scott, 2000; Kettl, 1992; Light, 1993;
McCubbins, & Schwartz, 1984; Rosen, 1989; Wood & Waterman, 1994),
the existence or effectiveness of the accountability-ethics relationship has
yet to be systematically examined. A growing body of work on
accountability implies that it has a significant impact on administrative
behavior (Behn, 2001; Caiden, 1988; Deleon, 1998; Dubnick & Romzek,
1991, 1993; Kearns, 1996; Romzek, 2000; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987,
1994, 2000; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000), but none of these studies
directly address how accountability impacts on the ethical standards and
strategies adopted by administrators.
The barriers to such an analysis have been conceptual and
methodological. Conceptually, both “accountability” and “ethical
behavior” have lacked the “sharpness” and clarity (Kaplan, 1964)
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required for analytic purposes. The concept of accountability has been
characterized as expansive (Mulgan, 2000) and chameleon-like (Sinclair ,
1995) as applied in both theory and practice, and the appropriate
meaning of ethical behavior has long been the subject of heated debate
between utilitarians and deontologists (among others) (Beu & Buckley,
2001; Garofalo & Geuras, 1999).
The lack of progress in
conceptualization, however, can be attributed to the institutional bias and
normative ambiguity fostered by our methodological approaches to both
terms. Accountability and ethical behavior are rarely perceived in
behavioral terms outside the institutional contexts that preoccupy
students of public administration. As a result, accountability becomes
associated with certain institutional forms of oversight and ethical
behavior becomes tangled in discussions of codes and legalisms. As
important has been the inability of analysts to put aside the normative
“baggage” that accompanies the use of such value-laden terms as
“accountable” and “ethical” when describing human behavior (Kaplan,
1964)
We can overcome these barriers by adopting a “middle range” or
“concrete theory” perspective (Elster, 1989, 1998; Hedström &
Swedberg, 1998; Lane, 1997) that allows us to reconceptualize both
accountability and ethical behavior as “social mechanisms” – that is, in
Robert Merton’s terms “social processes having designated
consequences for designated parts of the social structure”( Merton, 1968).
Applying this approach, we assume a sociological (rather than
institutional) view of accountability. The sociological view stresses the
forms and functions of accountability as processes (mechanisms) that
impact on social actors as situated pressures for account-giving behavior.
In this essay, we focus on four general types of mechanisms that demand
account-giving responses: answerability, blameworthiness, liability and
attributability.
Similarly, we regard ethical behaviors as social mechanisms
constituted as norms and standards of behavior generated as partial
responses to the pressures created by accountability mechanisms. In
contrast to both Kantian and utilitarian views of ethics that rely on the
existence of a priori knowledge or some universal standard, we assume a
more naturalistic (Harman, 1977) and pragmatic perspective that stresses
the functional role of ethics in dealing with social dilemmas (LaFollette,
2000; Flanagan, 1996; Putnam, 1998). Our focus is on the development
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and nurturing of ethical behaviors and strategies in response to major
forms of sociological accountability.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Three Approaches to Accountability
Analytically, the concept of accountability can be approached in
three ways: historically, institutionally and sociologically. Historic ally,
the term itself has distinctly Anglican and feudalistic roots, and has only
recently emerged as a universal standard of governance (Dubnick, 1998).
Mechanisms similar to the modern concept of accountability, however,
do have ancient roots in Athenia n democracy (Roberts, 1982; Elster,
1999). More than historical curiosities, both the Anglican and Athenian
views of accountability offer insights into modern accountability and
provide standards by which to assess the various approaches that emerge
from sociological analyses. For present purposes, however, we will focus
attention on those views derived from the contemporary study of social
relationships.
Institutional perspectives approach accountability as formalized
means of feedback and control established with governance structures of
states and corporate entities (Schedler, 1999). This view covers a wide
range of phenomena, from constitutions to financial reporting standards,
and has been the dominant perspective in the study of bureaucratic
accountability (Burke, 1986; Gruber, 1987; Rosen, 1989).
Sociological perspectives focus attention on accountability as a type
of social act that is part of a larger class of social processes or
mechanisms dealing with the need to repair or overcome damaged
relationships resulting from “unanticipated or untoward behavior” (Scott
& Lyman, 1968). That group of mechanisms includes confessing to the
action or seeking forgiveness (Tavuchis, 1991), subjecting oneself to
punishment or retribution (Minow, 1998; Borneman, 1997), engaging in
“good works” to make amends for the damage done or seeking the
restoration of one’s good name (Benoit, 1995), and associated behaviors
that stand as substitutes for (or complements of) giving an account of
one’s behavior.
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Giving of Accounts
Specifically, the social “giving of accounts” occurs when one must
justify or provide excuses for the action that resulted in the faux pas or
untoward act that is the focus of attention (Scott & Lyman, 1968). One is
essentially not denying either active or passive involvement in the
particular indiscretion, but is engaging in an effort to explain why one
ought not to be held either fully or partly responsible. Justification
involves accepting responsibility for the act, but denying the immorality
or untowardness of the behavior’s consequences. Excuses, in contrast, do
not deny the negative consequences of the acts in question, but argues
that the account giver had no choice but to act badly and was therefore
not responsible (Scott & Lyman, 1968; Sykes & Matza, 1957). In this
sense, an individual is “accountable” to the extent that there exists an
expectation (Cava, West & Berman, 1995) within the community that
they would provide an explanation for any act regarded as worthy of
account giving.
While standing as a distinct type among the class of associate
mechanisms relating to repairing damaged relationships, account giving
may also serve as a necessary complement to the other forms. The
expectation to provide a justification or excuse for one’s actions may
include a demand for an accounting even if the individual confesses to
the act, apologizes, and submits to punishment or undertakes restitution.
Consider the case of Scott Waddle, commander of the submarine U.S.S.
Greeneville that collided with a Japanese vessel, the "Ehime Maru",
south of Hawaii on February 9, 2001. The incident, which led to nine
deaths, was the subject of a military court of inquiry, and by April
Commander Waddle had accepted “full responsibility and
accountability” for the accident and made several widely publicized
apologies. But in this instance, and others like it, the public admission of
guilt and expression of regret and apologies did not preclude the
requirement for an accounting of what took place. Thus, with each public
appearance, Commander Waddle had to relive the incident and provide
an account of why he acted as he did.
In contrast, there are some acts of omission or commission
considered so despicable that no amount of excuses or justifications
would be acceptable . For example, Adolph Eichmann, Albert Speer, and
other Nazis offered defenses of their actions based on accounts that they
were just “following orders,” carrying out their civic and legal “duties,”
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or (in the case of Speer) unaware of what was taking place despite their
prominent roles in the German war effort (Arendt, 1976; Sereny, 1995).
No account giving in the form of excuses or justifications was perceived
as acceptable.
Typology of Account-Giving Mechanisms
With its focus on actions taken in response to social expectations, the
sociological perspective can generate a useful typology of account-giving
mechanisms. Expectations relevant to providing an explanation for one’s
behavior can be viewed along two dimensions. First, the expectations can
be related to specific actors or they can focus on situations. Second, the
expectations setting or environment can be highly structured and
relatively stable or emergent and subject to fluctuation. Figure 1
illustrates the resulting forms of socially relevant accountability
emerging from relating these two dimensions.
In the sections that follow, we describe the distinctive features of the
resulting four types of account-giving mechanisms and discuss the
relevant literature associated with each. As important, we briefly
consider the implications of each for generating ethical behavior
mechanisms among those being held accountable. As we will see,
accountability and ethics are closely related both analytically and
empirically.

FIGURE 1

Types of Accountability
Expectations are:

Structured

Emergent

Related to Persons

A. ANSWERABILITY

B. BLAMEWORTHINESS

Related to Situations/
Events

C. LIABILITY

D. ATTRIBUTABILITY

TYPE A: ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-ANSWERABILITY

Demanding Answers
Role-specific expectations for account giving are those found in
highly structured social relationships where the tasks and obligations of
individuals are either clearly articulated (i.e., formalized) or so
“institutionalized” (in the sense of “regularized”) that they are perceived
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as inherent to the position a person is occupying (Turner, 1978; Biddle,
1986). We label this form of accountability “answerability” to stress the
idea that persons who fall in this category are expected to respond to
calls for giving an account upon demand. In short, that expectation
comes with their role. This conceptualization of accountability is among
the most commonly used, and has been central to contemporary studies
of democratic and organizational accountability (Caiden, 1988; Schedler,
1999).
Within democratic theory (Held, 1996; Pitkin, 1969), accountabilityas-answerability indicates a relationship between the governors and the
governed involving mechanisms requiring the former to inform the latter
of actions taken on their behalf (i.e., in their “interest”), and allowing the
latter to judge and take action against the former based on that
information. The specific mechanisms involved range from
accountability through elections (Fearon, 1999) and mediated procedures
(such as a “vote of no confidence” in parliamentary systems) (Laver &
Shepsle, 1999) to the creation and strengthening of “horizontal”
institutions such as courts and ombudsman offices (Schedler, Diamond &
Plattner, 1999). Accountability-as-answerability has also played a
central role in classic al and contemporary organization theory, where the
central problem has been to develop mechanisms (e.g., chain of
command, limited span of control) and related strategies for creating and
sustaining cooperative social systems (Barnard, 1968; March, 1958;
McGregor, 1960).
Answerabilty Research
There have been several streams of research associated with
accountability-as-answerability mechanisms, each applying a distinct
model of the social relationship involved and generating a different
picture of the ethical implications of answerability. One stream models
answerability as a relationship between an accountable individual and the
audience to which he or she must provide the account. In a series of
articles published in the 1980s, Teltock and his colleagues found that
being told one must provide a justification for a decision had a
significant influence on the individual’s approach to each decision
(Tetlock, 1983a, 1983b, 1985; Tetlock & Kim, 1987). Moreover,
individuals put in such situations were motivated to seek the approval of
their perceived audiences, leading Tetlock to develop an “accountability
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theory” emphasizing the view of answerable individuals as “intuitive
politicians” “whose primary goal is to protect their social identities in the
eyes of the key constituencies to whom they feel accountable” (Tetlock,
Skitka & Boettger, 1989).
In contrast, a principal-agent theory stream provides a contractual
context within which answerability mechanisms and relationships are
used to overcome the inherent “moral hazard” and “selection” problems
principals face when relying on an agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miller, 1992;
Moe, 1995; Waterman & Meier, 1998). Here the answerability
mechanisms are regarded as structural responses to dilemmas created by
the effort of rational principals attempted to control rational agents, each
pursuing their own self-interest.
A third research stream, the “new institutionalism,” regards
organized behavior as dominated by rules and institutional norms, and
would treat answerability as part of that rule -structure (March & Olsen,
1984, 1989, 1995). The accountable individual is a rule -follower whose
actions are governed by what March and Olsen termed, the “logic of
appropriateness.” Under this logic, accountability-as-answerability is
dominated by three questions: What kind of situation is this? Who am I
(i.e., what is my identity or role)? And what is the rule I should follow
given my identity and the situation? (March, 1994).
Answerability Ethics
The three perspectives on accountability-as-answerability
present us with alternative models of the accountable actor, and thus
imply three models of ethical behavior mechanisms. The ethics of
Tetlock’s intuitive politician are driven by the psychological need to be
accepted by the “audience” – in the case of elected officials, the
electorate or the people; in the case of a public administrator, the client
or supervisor or stakeholder. This can result in an approach that judges
the ethicality of actions on the basis of their strategic value (Paul &
Strbiak, 1997). The ethics of the rational self-interested agent is shaped
by that individual’s calculation of what actions will best suit his or her
interests, whether those interests are focused on the accumulation of
power, the accumulation of wealth, or some other goal (Bøhren, 1998;
Brehm & Gates, 1997). The rule -follower’s ethics is primarily shaped by
role expectations and the individual’s social identity – a fact that leads
him or her to select the most “appropriate” action among alternatives
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based on assessments of what best fits that identity and set of
expectations.
What these three ethical roles share in common is a reliance on
exogenous signals or structures. The intuitive politician is constantly
monitoring his or her audience for signals about appropriate behavior,
while the rational agent is engaged in ongoing calculations about that
behavior that will provide the best payoff. The rule -follower, in the
meantime, is always engaged in balancing the expectations associated
with his or her social identity with the demands of the situation. All three
look outward as they make their ethical choices, and all three reflect a
concern for the consequences of their actions. In that sense, Type A
accountability tends to make administrators rely on various forms of
ethical mechanisms stressing the consequences of their actions vis-à-vis
the expectations of those to whom they are answerable. This stress on
consequences will, in turn, lead to the adoption of ethical strategies
drawn from teleologic al schools of ethics (Scheffler, 1994), giving
logical support to the various models of bureaucratic behavior applied or
implied in many positive, political and organizational theories. Among
positive theories of bureaucratic behavior, mechanisms rooted in
utilitarian ethics (act, rule and motive) are the assumed position for
administrator actions. Similarly, political theories of bureaucratic
behavior emphasize mechanisms that enhance the influence and power of
agencies, while organization theories focus on the striving for autonomy,
security and resources. Implied in all these models is a set of ethical
strategies closely linked to Type A accountability.
TYPE B: ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-BLAMEWORTHINESS

Status -Based Accountability
While accountability is most often thought of in terms of
answerability, it is not always applied to persons in specific and defined
roles. Blameworthiness as a form of accountability involves a shift in
focus from specific roles and contractual obligations as an agent to one’s
perceived social status and membership in some group that has status.
While role identifies what tasks and functions you perform, status
implies power and influence within the organization (Stryker & Macke,
1978). Put briefly, one is held accountable not because of one’s tasks or
formal responsibilities, but because of one’s relative social position or
identification with a certain group. Thus, you are held accountable
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because you are regarded as a socially, if not organizationally,
blameworthy (Dubnick, 1996).
In its most extreme form, Type B accountability involves
“scapegoating” – that is, imposing blameworthiness on a group simply
by characterizing it as the source of the undesirable condition (Douglas,
1995; Girard, 1986). It is, in Peter Gay’s words, the construction of a
“convenient Other” upon whom one can visit all the blame for any
problem – and against whom we can target our anger and aggression
(Gay, 1993).
But accountability-as-blameworthiness can take less extreme forms
as well. In military organizations, for example, those at the highest
echelons of any unit are deemed blameworthy and accountable for events
that occur on their “watch.” This form of accountability differs from
mere answerability, which is related to whether one is performing one’s
specific role. Here the primary issue is one’s status as the commanding
officer that is most important.
A relevant case is that of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at the time of the Japanese
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 194l. There is no
question that the devastation wrought by Japan’s forces was causally
responsible for the damages suffered on that “day of infamy.” Yet both
Admiral Kimmel and Lt General Walter Short, who was Commanding
General of the local Army contingent, were officially blamed and
sanctioned for the state of “unreadiness” at Pearl Harbor on the morning
of the infamous attack, and their careers were ended despite their
potential value as commanders in the war that followed (Cohen & Gooch,
1991). Similarly, in a statement issued in July, 1997, then-Secretary of
Defense William Cohen held Brigadier General Terryl Schwalier
“personally accountable” for the lax force protection that led to the death
of 19 American service personnel at the Khobar Towers bombing a year
earlier (Cohen, 1997). The facts in both cases indicated that there was
more blame to go around than that visited on Kimball, Short or
Schwalier, but that is not the way accountability operates in the military.
“In the military,” observed Judith Shklar, “responsibility has to be
personalized at the highest level of the organization since its system of
command is built on the principles of obedience and reliance…. We
cannot afford to be philosophically discriminating when our security
depends on maintaining the principles of hierarchical responsibility for
victory and defeat, especially the latter” (Shklar, 1990, p. 63).
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Blameworthiness In Public Service Cultures
While accountability-as-blameworthiness is an accepted part of
military culture (and can be found in some organizations that model
themselves after the military, e.g. some police forces), it is rarely evident
in other formal organization contexts. However, it is a pervasive
presence in the extra-organizational contexts of public service. Our
government and its agents operate in a culture where officials are
implicitly held blameworthy for all possible misfortunes, regardless of
causal responsibility (Dubnick, 1996; Shklar, 1990). A hurricane is an
act of nature, but government meteorologists will be held accountable for
forecasting its exact point of impact as well as expected intensity, and
local emergency preparedness offices will be blamed if proper steps were
not taken to deal with the storm’s impact. In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
issues were raised about the competence and culpability of the U.S.
intelligence community as well as security at America’s airports. Within
two weeks of those tragic events, the media began to castigate the
policies of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service for its
inability to track aliens who remained in the country illegally. Like other
public sector agencies, they were blameworthy; unlike others, they were
called into account for their implied role in facilitating the devastating
attack.
What is involved in this form of accountability comes close to what
is traditionally termed “moral responsibility.” As Marion Smiley notes,
in both its Christian and Kantian forms, moral responsibility implied the
existence of some higher or external authority. Under those forms,
blameworthiness was a matter of whether one was in a position to violate
the norms of those universal standards that constituted morality. But in
discussing accountability-as-blameworthiness, we are focused on the
social construction of blameworthiness and the social practice of blaming
(Smiley, 1992). We are blameworthy as a result of our status within a
community (e.g., the mayor) or organization (e.g., the general), and not
due to any specific task responsibilities or actual authority; and we are
blameworthy because we are members of a group whose members are
regarded as blamable (e.g., bureaucrats, politicians), and not because
anyone in that group could really be an effective agent.
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Type B Ethical Responses
The ethics of those facing Type B accountability is necessarily
pragmatic in the broadest sense of that term, and can take three forms
beyond the mere passive acceptance of one’s fate as a blameworthy actor.
First,
accountability-as-blameworthiness
can
be
approached
instrumentally. Faced with the social reality of blameworthiness, the
accountable individual should use the situation to deal with the
challenges within that context. The heads of agencies that have been
subjected to severe criticism for past performance can use the
opportunity to strengthen the organizations capacities for the future. In
response to their experiences as field-level soldiers in Vietnam, the
officers who rose through the military’s ranks from the mid-1970s
through the 1980s developed ethical strategies that literally transformed
the role of the armed forces in U.S. policy as well as the way the military
was perceived by the public and perceived itself (Woodward, 1991;
Kitfield, 1995). An equally dramatic transformation of the ethical and
operational norms of the Federal Emergency Management Agency took
place under James Lee Witt, who assumed his position in April 1993 in
the wake of severe criticism for FEMA’s handling of recent disaster
relief efforts.
A second approach is to assume a commitment to a deontological
moral standard (Chandler, 1994) that would meet with widespread
approval within the community or organization. The call for public
administrators to focus on “service” rather tan “steering” (Denhardt &
Denhardt, 2000), to engage in the pursuit of the “public interest”
(Huddleston, 1981-82; Marx, 1949), to adopt a professional standard of
social equity (Frederickson, 1997; Marini, 1971), or to “refound” itself in
the regime values of the constitution (Wamsley & Wolf, 1996; Wamsley
et al., 1990), are part of this effort to fill the moral void implied by the
condition of blameworthiness.
The third approach is to engage in an “identity shift” by dissociating
oneself from the blameworthy status or group. Under the view of social
constructivism, just as certain groups are regarded as blameworthy, so
other groups are inherently praiseworthy. In lieu of a tag such as
“bureaucrat” or government employee, one can stress a professional
identity such as city planner, park ranger or law enforcement official.
These identity shifts, in turn, have implications for the type of
accountability and ethical standards one is subject to. Of course, as social
constructions, the blameworthiness of these identities can vary from
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place to place and overtime. Police officers in a small midwestern town
will faces a different set of community expectations than their peers in
New York or Los Angeles; similarly, the status and perception of an FBI
agent in the 1990s was quite different from that of the 1950s.
Common among these three Type B responses is the establishment
of credibility for public administrators as autonomous ethical actors. The
post-Vietnam era commanders focused on establishing and articulating
basic rules for the use of military force – rules that sometimes led them
to openly resist putting U.S. personnel in harm’s way when other options
were available. The military professionalism represented by the likes of
George Patton was replaced by the model provided by Colin Powell and
his cohort (Campbell, 1998). The call for the public service professional
to give priority to general ethical commitments is also a step toward
asserting an ethically autonomous position, as is the effort to create a
distinct professional identity among the public service professions. Each
of these is a means toward the realization of Carl Friedrich’s model of
the responsible administrator.
TYPE C: ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-LIABILITY

Law-Like Situations
In contrast with accountabilities based on the expectations related to
persons, Types C and D accountabilities focus on the structure of the
situation in which actors operate. Although posited as distinct types,
accountability-as-liability and accountability-as-attributability would
more appropriately be described as forms found at opposite ends of a
continuum. At one end are highly structured contexts in which
expectations are well defined and clear to all; at the other extreme are
situations so vaguely defined that they almost devoid of stable
expectations. Our present focus, Type C accountability, falls on the
“highly structured” section of that range.
As implied in its name, accountability-as-liability is closely
associated with a legalist view of the world in which actions are guided
and assessed according to rules that carry sanctions for non-compliance
(Shklar, 1986). Unlike answerability (Type A), where expectations for
accountability derive from the actor’s institutional role or organizational
position, liability stresses the requirements of the structured situation.
The nature of that structure can vary from the strictures of legal
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requirements backed by state sanctions to implicit contracts between two
parties that carry with them rewards for compliance and/or sanctions for
violations. At the core of all these mechanisms is the idea that law, in a
very general sense, is an effective way to establish and maintain order
and control (Pound, 1997; Schuck, 1999).
In a strictly formal sense, accountability-as-liability would be limited
to shaping one’s actions according to the “letter of the law” – that is,
doing what is required by law, and avoiding those actions prescribed
under law. For Type C accountability, however, the conception of law is
much broader, taking on the characteristics of both an institutional
setting (i.e., the “rule of law”) (Ingram, 1985; Hayek, 1972) and a
context for social relationships (Fuller, Elelman & Matusik, 2000;
Minow, 1990, 1997; Weber, 1978).
Issues of Liability
The relationships between Type C and other forms of accountability
are quite complex for two related reasons. First, ours is an
“organizational society” where individuals are constantly identified by
their role or status. It is rare to find a structured situation where one is
completely without some role identity. Accountability-as-liability,
however, tends to focus the act and its consequences rather than the actor
or her status-derived blameworthiness. In its most stringent form, Type C
accountability seeks out the actor who “did the deed” (was directly,
causally responsible) rather than the individual “in charge” or playing
some other relevant role. Thus, an individual in a supervisory role/status
would not be held accountable unless there was both evidence and
willingness to link that person to the untoward activity.
For example, in the case of the infamous 1969 My Lai massacre, the
U.S. Army felt that it had to treat the event as a legal case, and in so
doing it found its ability to hold people accountable severely limited.
Taking the legal liability route, the Army charged Lieutenant William
Calley with the premeditated murder of at least four civilians. Several
others in command positions at the scene of the massacre (which
involved at least 175 to 200 deaths) were initially charged, but it was
later decided to drop those charges in all but one additional case due to
“insufficient evidence” – a standard reflecting the legal nature of the
accountability approach being applied. The exception was Captain Ernest
Medina, Calley’s immediate superior officer, who was also brought to
trial charged with murder. There was a difference, however. The murder
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charges against him were not for specific acts of premeditated killing
(although evidence indicates that he killed at least four civilians at My
Lai); rather, he was charged with 102 murders under a provision of
military law that allowed prosecution of those with command
responsibility. He was court-martialed and acquitted of those charges.
Thus, although the military could have (and did in many cases) hold
many more persons blameworthy under its Type B accountability
approach (and subject to organizational sanctions), it held only Calley
legally liable for four of approximately 200 deaths and sentenced him to
twenty years in prison. By focusing on liability, in other words, and not
pursuing specific counts of premeditated murder again Medina and
others, the military was unable to fulfill the need for accountability-asliability.
This leads to the second issue associated with Type C accountability:
the problem of collective responsibility (French, 1997). Just as the legal
system has difficult dealing with collective responsibility (Stone, 1975),
liability-based accountability systems are constantly challenged by the
“many hands” problem (Thompson, 1980). As Dennis Thompson notes,
typical solutions to this problem include applying “hierarchical” or
“collective” forms of responsibility, and he finds both wanting. In their
place, he advocates applying “personal responsibility” approach based on
some weak causal connection between an individual and the event. In
terms of the present framework, that would mean shifting from Type C
to either Type A or Type B accountability – a move that raises issues
regarding the integrity and fairness of any sanctions that might be
imposed. As important, such an approach does not deal with the complex
situations where even a weak causal link cannot be proven. In such cases,
even the legal system has had to modify its standards by allowing
liability to rest almost entirely on an individual possible “fault” rather
than cause (Thomson, 1984).
As with its legal equivalent, the inherent problems of accountabilityas-liability are many (Howard, 1994b; Huber, 1988; Levmore, 1994;
Lieberman, 1981). Nevertheless, it is an approach to accountability that
is extremely important in public administration. A central factor shaping
Type C accountability for public administrators has been the judicial
treatment of two issues: administrative discretion and administrative
immunity. Historical shifts in the judiciary’s handling of administrative
discretion and delegation of authority cases (Horwitz, 1994; Stewart,
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1975) have altered the jurisdictions and tasks of administrative agencies
to such a degree (some have argued) that we have witnessed a de facto
constitutional transformation of the American republic (Lowi, 1979).
The courts’ willingness to lift the cover of sovereign immunity over the
past several decades (Rosenbloom, 1983, 1987) has been as significant in
its impact on the accountability, exposing administrators to legal actions
and making it urgent for them to become more “constitutionally
competent” (Rosenbloom, Carroll & Carroll, 2000).
But as significant has been the general impact on public
administration of the legalistic mindset fostered by these developments.
Almost every area of public management has shown signs of deference
to the “lawyers” perspective, and an abandonment of the administrator’s
view of the world (Dimock, 1980). The very act of entering the public
service places one in a distinctive legal relationship to the state
(Rosenbloom, 1971), and efforts to assure public employee integrity
through Type C approaches have been pervasive and often
counterproductive for the day-to-day operations of government
(Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996).
Law-Like Ethics
The ethics related to Type C accountability have their roots in
distinct and conflicting conceptions of law. Two approaches emerge
from debates among philosophers regarding the nature of law, while a
third is derived from the analogical reasoning used in the practice of law.
In the philosophy of law, a major division exists between those who
assume laws to be human artifacts without any inherent moral value (the
positivist school) and those who assess laws in terms of their relation to a
higher law standard (the natural law school). Each of these schools
generates a number of ethical positions, but for present purposes we will
offer them in caricature as the positivist ethics of obligation and the
naturalist ethics of conscience. As applied by those who are held
accountable, the ethics of obligation calls for adherence to the explicit
rules that define a situation. Here we find the ethics of neutral
competence that has been so central to the norms of American public
administration (Kaufman, 1956; Lockard, 1962; Finer, 1936; Rourke,
1992). The ethics of conscience, in contrast, is manifest in efforts to
have public administrators adhere to some “higher standard” when
engaged in the enforcement or implementation of the law. Here, again,
we find various standards from “regime values” and “public interest” to
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“social equity” and “justice-as-fairness” (Frederickson, 1997; Marshall &
Choudhury, 1997; Rohr, 1989, 1998).
A third ethical approach relevant to Type C accountability comes
from the practice of law. Sunstein (Sunstein, 1996) offers the term
“analogical reasoning” to describe the type of thinking that takes place in
legal practice. It is reasoning that focuses on applying laws and rules to
specific cases based on how that law or rule has been applied in the past
to similar (although not identical) cases. Sunstein highlights four features
of analogical reasoning. First, it is based on the norm of “principled
consistency” – that is, the need to provide some principle to “harmonize
seemingly disparate outcomes.” Second, there should be a focus on the
details of the case, letting the facts shape the decision. Third, analogical
reasoning avoids the application of any “deep or comprehensive theory”
that might overwhelm the facts of the case. Finally, this form of
reasoning produces and applies standards that should be at a “low or
intermediate level of abstraction.” In public administration, the ethics of
“constitutional competence” advocated by Rosenbloom and Carroll
(Rosenbloom, 1987; Rosenbloom, Carroll & Carroll, 2000) operates at
this analogical level by focusing on the need for public service
employees to become familiar with their place and responsibilities within
the U.S. constitutional system through relevant cases.
The common thread holding these Type C ethical strategies together
is their commitment to determining what is ethical through a reasoning
process – one guided by rules, the second by a higher standard, and the
third through analogy. In contrast to the stress on consequences
(generated by Type A account giving) and blame avoidance (through
Type B), the ethical approaches of Type C accountability rely on ethical
behavior mechanisms that call for an actor to engage in a certain type of
reasoning that fosters consideration of procedural requirements, legal
standards or precedent (Raz, 1990).
TYPE D: ACCOUNTABILITY-AS-ATTRIBUTABILITY

Relevance of Nonwork Expectations
Accountability-as-attributability brings into consideration those
arenas of social life where the rules and roles of public administration are
seemingly irrelevant, but in fact are potentially quite important in the
environment of accountability of public sector workers. It involves those
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contexts where the fact that an individual holds a certain position in an
organization, or that one is subject to rules and constraints in the
workplace, is of little or no consequence most of the time. It is the
context of the “nonwork domain” where one lives a “private life” distinct
from the public life of the government job. Or so it seems. In fact,
accountability pressures spillover into the private lives of all employees –
public and private.
In the nonwork domain, one is subject to accountability standards
that are broader in scope, more diverse, and constantly subject to change
over time and from place to place. The sources of those standards are
other social actors in the domain who regard an action or behavior as
requiring an accounting by some actor. In short, they attribute an action
or behavior to an individual and would expect an accounting if they were
in a position to demand one. This attributing behavior is regarded by
social psychologists as part of our standards means for making sense of –
and dealing with – the world (Forsyth, 1980; Crittenden, 1983; Howard,
1994a). From the perspective of “attribution theory” research, this form
of attribution is subject to ideological, cultural and stereotypical bias
(Howard & Pike, 1986; Al-Zahrani & Kaplowitz, 1993) as well as
situational determinism (Holloway & Fuller, 1983). In addition,
attributions tend to be unstable and malleable by changing conditions
such as information or expectations (Tetlock, 1985; Yarkin-Levin, 1983;
Tetlock, 1981). The shortcomings of such attributions, however, have
not diminished their relevance.
Being of “Suspect” Character
The link between specific instances of attribution and our Type D
accountability emerges when those attributions lead to the perception of
an individual as someone of suspect character given the actions attributed
to him or her. Thus, an individual seen emerging in a disheveled state
daily from a local bar might be regarded as a “drunk,” and someone cited
by police for speeding might be characterized as a reckless driver. An
attributed behavior becomes a character attribute, and it is the fact that
we are subject to such characterizations that can make us Type D
accountable. An individual whose actions in private life are found to be
questionable or potentially embarrassing to his employer is likely to find
him or herself being held accountable for those actions – despite their
irrelevance to the employee’s tasks or functions.
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This is especially true for those who hold public office. In the private
sector, the relevance of Type D accountability pressures is likely to
depend on a number of factors, including (but not limited to) one’s
position and status in the organization and the nature of the nonwork
behavior that triggers the concern. Is the individual a highly visible
employee whose offense impacts on the public image of the business?
Was the behavior so offensive that the presence of the individual will
result in significant losses in sales or productivity unless something is
done?
Exposure to this form of accountability is unavoidable, and yet
students of management have paid little attention to it (Cozzetto &
Pedeliski, 1996, 1997).
Scholars have long acknowledged the
intermingling of social and personal factors. They were central to the
work of the human relations school, and played an important role in
Barnard’s classic analysis of executive management (Barnard, 1968;
Roethlisberger, 1941). Interest in the relationship of family life to work
has produced a stream of research in sociology and organization studies
(Cohen, 1995; Bielby, 1992) including the examination of strategies
developed to deal with the boundaries between work and nonwork
(Kirchmeyer, 1977/1993, 1995). There is also research focused on the
nonwork lives of public sector workers in partic ular (Romzek, 1989;
Johnson & Duerst-Lahti, 1991; Romzek, 1985). But, with few
exceptions (Dworkin, 1997), little of this research considers the link
between personal life and accountability.
Uniqueness of Public Office Holding
The rules that protect one’s private life from public intrusions do not
necessarily apply to those in public offices. While modern society might
proffer the “principle of uniform privacy” as a desirable standard for all
its citizens, for public office holders it is the “principle of diminished
privacy” that is more likely to be applied. There are a variety of reasons
for this, including the perceived necessity to know more about the
behavior of those who wield power over us as well as expectations that
public officials must achieve a higher standard of conduct in their private
affairs than ordinary citizens (Thompson, 1987).
Of course, accountability-as-attributability is not limited to those
who hold public office. What kind of accountability is involved? Some
of it takes the form of formal constraints on the private, nonwork lives of
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government employees. Hatch Acts, conflict of interest legislation and
related policies are designed explicitly to deal with the perceived dangers
of having civil servants too actively engaged in politics or private
business enterprises (Rosenbloom, 1971; Thruber, 1993; Roberts, 1992;
Rosenbloom, 1988). Other examples are found in managerial strategies
to offset the potentially adverse impact of private preferences. The
possibility that employees or their families might grow too attached to
local communities (“going native”) has led some agencies to establish
personnel transfer policies to minimize the influence of nonwork factors
(Kaufman, 1967). Concern for an agency’s reputation or public image is
also used as a rationale for holding employees accountable for their
private behavior and lifestyles. Private behavior has been regarded as
grounds for adverse personnel actions, even if the behavior had little or
nothing to do with the position of workplace (Lewis, 1997). As
significant, the courts have held that the “perception” of questionable
private behavior can be used to take action against a public employee
(see Wild v. U.S., 1982) (Stark, 1995).
Type D Ethical Strategies
The ethical responses to Type D accountability pressures are likely
to require that the individual accept the linkages between one’s personal
and professional/work lives. Two assumptions are at work here. First is
the assumption that individuals accepting a public office does so with the
expectation that they will be subject to diminished privacy and greater
scrutiny of their behavior. Second is the fact that in today’s complex
social world, efforts to carve out a private space free from the intrusions
of work or public life is all but impossible. At least some aspects of the
behavior attributed to the individual in his or her personal life are
relevant to how that individual will be viewed in his or her working life –
and vice versa. This fact of modern social life means that the ethical
demands of work life often overlap or intrude into the ethics of personal
life, a phenomenon that has been at the center of many of the most
popular and influential studies of American social dynamics over the past
half century (Bellah et al., 1985, 1991; Whyte, 1956; Coleman, 1982).
The result is the blurring of the lines between one’s personal and work
life ethics.
Thus, the individual must constantly contend with an existential
conflict between ethical demands generated by one’s role expectations,
perceived blameworthiness or liability, and those related to one’s
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standing as an autonomous private individual or citizen. In some cases,
the solution would be an ethical position that subordinates at least some
of one’s personal autonomy to the demands emerging from Types A, B
or C accountability. Accepting the limits on one’s citizenship rights is the
price paid under certain Hatch Act provisions, just as the Forest Ranger
accepts the order to move her family to the next assignment station. As
significant is the choice to subordinate one’s private tastes and behavior
to the demands imposed by one’s job or status (Hummel, 1994; Denhardt,
1981).
A more positive stance has been articulated by Terry Cooper in his
calls for a “citizenship ethics” that he later presents as the “responsible
administrator” model (Cooper, 1991, 1998). Subordination of the
personal is replaced with a commitment to continuously reflect on one’s
life as a public administrator. Implied is the idea that one can achieve
self-actualization through such an ethical stance, an idea that traces back
to ancient ethics and its emphasis on ethics as a means for achieving the
good (e.g., happiness) in oneself (in contrast to the modern focus on
achieving the good for others) (Annas, 1992).
At a more general level, the response to Type D accountability might
be the adoption of a virtue or character ethics approach. In an
environment where standards and rules are ambiguous or unstable, it
would be reasonable to assume that a consistent adherence to some
higher standards of personal conduct (e.g., to be trustworthy, honest,
benevolent, caring) would provide some protection from the whims of
accountability-as-attribution. Some have articulated this in terms of
being a person of “good character” (Luke, 1994). It can also involve a
commitment to act virtuously on and off the job as the situation requires
(Frederickson & Hart, 1985, 1997; Hart, 1984, 1994; Hart & Smith,
1988), or at least to avoid falling prey to the “ordinary vices” that
plagued us in both our private and public existence (Shklar, 1984).
The ethical path selected in response to Type D accountability
pressures has implications for the general orientation of the individual
toward the other forms of accountability. Deference to the intrusions of
accountability-as-attributability is most closely associated with the norm
of political neutrality that has characterized mainstream public
administration for many decades. A “citizenship ethics” is likely to
complement the effort to promote competency-centered ethics, while
implied in the virtue/character ethics approaches is a view of the public
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administrator as a more actively engaged autonomous ethical agent who
understands his or her moral obligations (Bowens, 1998).
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

Among the various issues raised by the Friedrich-Finer debate, those
focused on accountability-ethics relationships are at once the most
significant and least explored. Despite the lack of explicit attention to
that relationship in the public administration literature, there are
obviously considerable resources that can be brought to bear on this topic.
Through the reconceptualization of the key terms in that relationship, this
essay opens the door to a more thorough examination of the relevant
issues.
Such an examination would begin with a further elaboration and
empirical validation of the associations summarized in Figure 2. If those
posited relationships are validated, the implications for our
understanding of administrative behavior can be significant. By focusing
on accountability and ethical norms and standards as social mechanisms,
we can start to re-explore the “black box” of “contingent” administrative
behavior that has been so central to public administration scholarship
since Herbert Simon began to model the administrative decision maker in
the 1940s. Relying on social mechanisms in lieu of models and positive
theory assumptions about bureaucratic behavior, we are able to consider
various forms of reasoning and “reasons” that help shape administrative
choices and behavior (Elster, 1989; Hedström & Swedberg, 1998).
There are also potential implications for those concerned with
institutional design and administrative reform. Reformers who advocate
FIGURE 2

Accountability-Ethics Relationships
Accountability Type
A. Answerability
B. Blameworthiness
C. Liability
D. Attributability

Ethical strategies based on:
Intuitive
politician
Instrumental

Rational agent

Higher moral
standard
Positivist
Naturalist
obligation
conscience
Subordination Citizenship
ethics

Rule -follower
Identity shift
Analogical reasoning
competence
Virtue/character
ethics
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greater accountability, for instance, typically put forward suggestions
that create or enhance answerability mechanisms. A more fully
elaborated “theory” of the relationship between accountability and
ethical strategies would help us assess the potential impact of alternative
forms of answerability as well as explain the success or failure of various
reforms. The same logic could be useful in highlighting the source of
current problems. What might otherwise be perceived as an arbitrary
abuse of discretionary authority, for example, might be back to the
absence of (or an indifference to) Type C accountability mechanisms.
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